Another salvo was recently launched in the ongoing battle between the State's legislators and its judiciary (and, likely, personal injury lobbyists as well) on the issue of damage caps. In this instance, the action dealt with caps on medical malpractice claims. N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S642 (Fla. June 8, 2017).
In Kalitan, the Supreme Court of Florida considered and dismissed notions of a "continuing medical malpractice insurance crisis" listed and argued by the State in support of damage caps on medical malpractice claims for personal injury non-economic (i.e., 'pain and suffering') damages. The Court found that the caps violated the Equal Protection Clause, citing its own opinion in a previous case where it determined that a similar cap was unconstitutional because it "'imposes unfair and illogical burdens on injured parties' and 'does not bear a rational relationship to the stated purpose that the cap is purported to address, the alleged medical malpractice insurance crisis in Florida.'"
It seems strange to say that damage caps, which aim to reduce potential exposure for insurers, is not rationally related to that aim, however, the Court pointed out that there was a lack of evidence to suggest the caps "that were intended to reduce instances of doctors leaving Florida, retiring early, or refusing to perform high risk procedures" were actually having that effect or were even resulting in lower premiums. The Court noted that Insurance company profits were up following the caps, but that the savings were not being passed on to individual insured physicians.
This case certainly seems to be a situation where insurers may have made their own bed and are now being forced to lie in it. If the insurers had been able to produce evidence that they had actually reduced premiums and increased the number of insured physicians, they may have been able to preserve the caps. Yet, instead it appears the insurers took the stance that putting money directly into their coffers now made more business sense.
It is unlikely this decision will end the debate (or legislation) on damage caps, especially given the State's finding that "Florida is in the midst of a medical malpractice insurance crisis of unprecedented magnitude." Ch. 2003-416, § 1, Laws of Fla., at 4035.
National homebuilder powerhouse Taylor Morrison suffered a setback on its attempts to force buyers into arbitration when they allege building code violations. In the Second District Court of Appeals, the case of Reginald Anderson v. Taylor Morrison of Fla., Inc., 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1232 (Fla. 2d DCA May 31, 2017), dealt with the builder's attempts to enforce an arbitration agreement contained in its form Purchase and Sale Agreement against the buyers who were alleging defects in the home they purchased.
The Court determined that the Taylor Morrison contract attempted to limit or circumvent statutory protections for the buyers under Florida law, so the contract itself violated public policy and was not enforceable against the buyers alleging the construction defects. In reaching this conclusion, the Second District stated that a contract violates public policy where it "defeats the remedial purpose of a statute or prohibits the plaintiff from obtaining meaningful relief under the statutory scheme." Anderson v. Taylor Morrison of Fla., Inc., 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1232.
It appears, based on this ruling, that Taylor Morrison will have to go back to the figurative drawing board in order to find a way around statutory protections for buyers of its homes.
If you have a question about or a dispute with a builder regarding a home or other purchase and sale contract, or are experiencing construction defects, the experienced construction litigation attorneys at Icard Merrill may be able to help you.
An interesting case fact pattern helps answer a common question that clients have; "can I get pain and suffering or punitive damages in a contract case?" In the case of Deauville Hotel Mgmt., LLC v. Ward, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1219 (Fla. 3d DCA May 31, 2017), the Third District Court of Appeals gives a nice illustration of the damage types (and the principles underlying those types) available in a contract case.
In Deauville Hotel Mgmt., LLC v. Ward, the plaintiffs had contracted to hold their wedding reception in the defendant hotel's ballroom, but found out just hours before their wedding that the ballroom was no longer available (due to a shut down for building code violations) and the couple was forced to hold their reception for 190 people in the hotel's lobby (where other hotel patrons walked through--some in their swimsuits--and participated in the festivities). The couple, mortified, brought the lawsuit for various types of damages, including punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress (a rare exception to the Florida rule that there must be a physical touching in order to collect for purely emotional damages). The jury actually found that the hotel had committed conduct that was so extreme and outrageous as to shock the conscience--the standard for a successful intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
The Third District, however, reversed on that point and nullified the emotional distress verdict. The Court cited two cases where outrageous conduct--one in which a pastor was called a 'thief' in front of his congregation and one in which an employee was subjected to racial slurs and threats of termination--was found not outrageous enough to trigger emotional distress damages.
Further, the Court reduced the amount of economic damages awarded to the plaintiffs on the basis that they did actually get to use portions of the "flowers, linens, photography, videography, entertainment, transportation, and cake" at the location where the wedding was held (even though they were not available for the reception) and to award them the cost as well as the use of the items would have been duplicative.
In all, the plaintiffs likely felt emotionally abused at the hands of the appellate court following this decision, but the legal underpinnings of the decision were soundly based in the applicable law and parties curious about the way damages work in contract cases can get a helpful primer by reviewing the Court's opinion.
A recent decision in the 11th Circuit in Broward County highlights a rule that can have very severe application for tenants in an eviction case. The case of Fagan v.New Hope Dream Team Charity, Inc. (24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 925a) reminds tenants of the pitfalls of 83.20(2), Florida Statutes. In fact, this section has been referred to as being a "no mercy" system for tenants, as well as commonly called "pay to play." The Section requires tenants, within only five days after being served with the complaint, to either post with (i.e., pay to) the clerk of the court all of the claimed back owed rent or to file a motion to determine how much that rent should be. If the tenant fails to do either, the landlord is entitled--without a hearing or notice--to a court order granting the landlord possession of the property and the tenant is deemed to have waived all defenses related to the possession of the property.
While many deadlines in litigation can be either extended or even remedied if the missing of such a deadline was a good faith mistake with proper action taken to correct it quickly, Florida Statutes 83.20 allows for no wiggle room or apologies. In fact, courts are forbidden from even taking into consideration the reasons the deadline was missed (including potentially even a serious injury or other real and actual emergency). See, Park Adult Residential Facility, Inc. v. Dan Designs, Inc., 36 So. 3d 811, *812 (Fla 3d DCA 2010).
It is critical that both landlords and tenants know their rights and be aware of the timelines and requirements imposed in an eviction in order to preserve that party's rights in a landlord-tenant eviction action. If you have questions about your lease or about eviction, contact our landlord-tenant litigators today.
A 2017 case decided in the Third District illustrates one of the (numerous) nuances of offers of judgment and proposals for settlement pursuant to Florida Statutes § 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. Case law has traditionally referred to a requirement that these procedural mechanisms for triggering liability for attorneys' fees must be made in "good faith" with respect to the amount offered. There have been numerous cases exploring the issue of whether offers are made in good faith and whether certain offer amounts can lead to a finding that the offer was not made in good faith.
As the Court notes in its opinion UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. PARTNERS IN HEALTH CHIROPRACTIC CENTER (24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 785a), "[t]he rule is that a minimal offer can be made in good faith if the evidence demonstrates that, at the time it was made, the offeror had a reasonable basis to conclude that its exposure was nominal.” E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sharkey, 928 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D1445a] (citations and quotation marks omitted)." However, the important part of that ruling could be argued to be that the party could reasonably believe "its exposure" was nominal. The instant case seems to expand that ruling.
In this action, the defendant proposed settlement for a total amount of $500. The defendant argued after the fact that the offer was made in good faith since the insurance company believed the whole time that it was very likely to win the case. Having litigated many dozens of cases, this blog's author has yet to meet a party that did not feel it was right and at least fairly likely to win the case. However, the Court noted that, since the defendant was consistent (or perhaps persistent) in its belief that it was, indeed, correct and would win at trial, the offer was made in good faith.
What was argued--and ultimately dismissed by the Court--was that the defendant's exposure could never really have been anywhere close to $500. Since there were legal issues being decided on both a helpful and hurtful side of the fence for defendants during the action, the insurer would eventually be proven right or wrong. Although the chances of being proven right may have been on the side of the insurer, leading to its confidence in its position, its exposure if incorrect would have always been far greater than the $500 offered. Therefore, the rule of assessing reasonable expectations of "exposure" could be argued to have melded into the concept of self-confidence in the likelihood of success. Based on this ruling, any party who ultimately prevails will need to show only that an offer was made and that the party was very sure throughout the case that it would win and the proposal is likely to be upheld (especially so since it is very difficult to argue that an expectation of winning was unreasonable when a party does indeed win down the road).
If you have questions about your case or the complex world of offers of judgment or proposals for settlement, contact one of our litigation attorneys today.
An opinion issued by the Supreme Court of Florida in April touched on a mixture of long-time and more recently trending complaints about personal injury litigation in Florida and raised serious questions on what could be argued has become an industry of sorts.
In Worley v. Central Florida Young Men's Christian Ass'n, Inc. 42 Fla. L. Weekly S443b (Fla., 2017), the Court examined practices by a large and very well-known Florida law firm (you've seen the billboards and likely heard the radio or television ads, as well) and the firms "network" of physicians and health care providers and how the firm advises its clients.
In Worley, the allegations of the insurance company were essentially that the firm was steering clients (including perhaps those that did not ask for help seeking medical attention) to several health care providers that had a "cozy agreement" with the firm. The insurance company argued that cozy relationship included the fact that health care providers provided care almost entirely on the basis of "letters of protection" (which means the facility agrees it will provide services with the hope of getting paid from the personal injury lawsuit and not the patient at the time of service) and that the bills generated for those services were extremely high (or, in some cases, potentially fraudulently high) compared to other providers in the area. Implied in the claims by the insurer is the concept that these providers could be rendering these bills as part of a scheme to help the law firm increase damages for purposes of settlement or trial.
The Supreme Court did not allow the insurer to do further discovery into the nature and extent of the relationship between it and the health care providers through the firm's client and further refused to allow inquiry into whether the firm "steered" the client to these providers. This ruling may help keep the shroud in place which covers the potentially seedier side of financial relationships between some law firms and some medical providers in personal injury cases. Some may argue that this ruling could embolden law firms to push the limits of ethical or legal behavior in relationships with care providers given the financial incentive to bend or break the rules and the protections from discovery that this ruling could yield.
We have on several occasions in this blog touched on the requirements of standing for the lender, evidentiary requirements for the default notice, and foundation for bank witnesses. Though recently there had seemed to be a tightening of requirements for proving the sending of the default notice and for qualifying a witness to speak on another institution's default notice generation protocols and record-keeping, a recent case seems to again potentially lessen the burden on lenders seeking to foreclose.
In the case of JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. JEAN PIERRE 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 4632, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D 781, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Apr. 5, 2017), the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed judgment in favor of the borrowers and ordered entry of judgment for the lender (actually, the successor in interest to the lender) on the basis that the trial court's findings that the bank had not proven that a default notice had been sent and that it had not proven standing were contrary to the law.
In this case, though the witness that appeared worked for a third party servicer for the bank, she speculated about the date upon which the note had been transferred and testified that the servicer--not the bank that brought the action--owned the note. Further, she testified that she had learned during her training at the servicer about the original (not the current lender that her company was actually representing) lender's default notice generation protocols and that she was aware, generally, with those protocols and that her company had verified through collection notes that the letter had been sent.
Citing issues with standing given the testimony by the record custodian that a party other than that which filed the complaint actually owned the note and testimony which apparently led the trial court to determine the witness did not have actual familiarity with the originating lender's default notice policy, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the borrowers. The appellate court reversed and ordered entry of judgment in favor of the lender, stating (in sum) that the stated familiarity with the process by which a third party originating lender generally goes about sending letters with notice of default was sufficient and that it did not particularly matter when the witness believed the endorsement was signed transferring the note and it did not particularly matter that the witness thought her company owned the note in question rather than the Plaintiff lender.
A subtle maneuver was made by the appellate court here, as well. Though the standard of review was de novo, since the issues were deemed a matter of law, the question of whether the witness knew about the default notice procedure and whether a letter was sent was an issue of fact, since the borrowers had denied that a letter had been sent. The appellate court seems to have taken the bank witness testimony at face value and disregarded the denial by the borrowers that any notice had been sent. The trial court (which is presumed to be in the best positoin to weigh credibility of a witness) was disregarded by the appellate court on this point, which perhaps was due to the fact that the trial court did not make a finding on the record that the witness was not credible in her testimony.
Compare this case to the recently reviewed case of Allen v. Wilmington Trust, N.A., 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3970 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), which we discussed here.
If you have questions about a foreclosure, a contract, or other real estate dispute reach out to the foreclosure attorneys of Icard Merrill today.
The question of who "holds" the note and mortgage (even where, as is often the case, the 'holder' cannot physcially hold the note and mortgage because they are lost) is one of the most often litigated aspects in residential foreclosures. Borrowers in default and looking for ways to keep their home (or at least to stay in the home mortgage free for as long as possible), often find themselves getting a crash course over the internet on concepts such as the "holder" of the note, indorsements, allonges, indorsements in blank, and standing. Speak to a borrower that is a veteran of a multi-year, multi-action foreclosure and an uninitiated attorney may even learn a few things about these terms as well.
Another recent case before the Fourth DCA touches on several of these concepts and helps give more guidance to those defaulted borrowers seeking to stem the virtually inevitable tide of foreclosure of their home. As the court in PennyMac Corp. v. Frost, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) stated, the note in question was originally indorsedn in blank by the original lender, however, that indorsement was marked "void." Subsequently, an allonge and blank indorsement was executed by a successor in interest to the original lender. The borrower argued (and the trial court agreed) that the original void indorsement rendered any subsequent indorsement invalid for purposes of standing without more steps being taken as a nonholder in possession of the note and with the rights of a holder.
Foreclosure actions can be challenging and very confusing to the uninitiated. Talk to an attorney in the foreclosure group at Icard Merrill today if you have questions about your home and mortgage.
The Second DCA issued an opinion this month on a topic that has become a bit of a hot button issue and technique among defense firms in recent months--the practice of seeking dismissal on the basis of a plaintiff's alleged fraud on the court. In Duarte v. Snap-On, Inc., 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3414 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), the Court outlined what has become a popular tool for defense counsel; the defense finds discrepancies between a complaint, the party's discovery responses, and the party's deposition testimony and highlights those discrepancies in a motion to dismiss the case on the basis of an attempted fraud against the court.
The reasoning is sound, if less than scrupulous; the defense gets a second chance to dismiss the case without a trial if it can show discrepancies (which exist for all parties--plaintiffs and defendants--in virtually all actions), or at worst, simply gets an opportunity to attempt to paint the other party as a liar or a non-credible witness. The Second DCA decision in Duarte helps outline the high burden for dismissal for fraud on the court by stating that the party seeking dismissal needs to prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that
his opponent "sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense
Thus, neither a mistake nor a lie is sufficient to justify dismissal in most cases. As has long been the case, the court points out that:
Generally, unless it appears that the process of trial has itself been subverted, factual inconsistencies or even false statements are well
managed through the use of impeachment at trial or other traditional discovery sanctions, not through dismissal of a possibly meritorious claim.
However, some attorneys seem to find that simply impeaching a party at trial is less effective than attempting to poison the court against that party before the trial even begins, which may explain the recent proliferation this blogger has perceived in use of this technique in recent months.
In another high water mark for protections for employers, the recent case of Allied Universal Corp. v. Given, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3459 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), outlined various protections for employers from other cases and resulted in a case that is likely to be often cited by employers in their battles against former employees in the area of non-compete litigation.
The Third DCA starts by broadly construing Section 542.335, Florida Statutes (Valid restraints of trade or commerce) by referencing protections for "goodwill associated with an "ongoing business or professional practice," among other things, as a basis for injunctive relief. What makes the construction broad is that the Court found that the employer needed only establish that there were legitimate business interests, at which time there became a "rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury for purposes of obtaining a temporary injunction under section 542.335(1)(j)."
Unlike in many instances, the employer here was not required to show any actual interference with specific current or potential customers, nor any actual injury or damage. Simply having legitimate interests was enough to flip the burden of proof to the employee, who was expected to have evidence at the temporary injunction stage to show that the employer had not been damaged. Understandably, the employee was unable to show the absence of injury of any sort to the employer at that early stage and an injunction was entered against the employee. Often, the granting of an injunction is enough to break the employee's resistance and to end the case (since now the employee is unemployed, which makes funding ongoing litigation difficult, if not pointless).
A recently decided case in the Second District Court of Appeals, Allen v. Wilmington Trust, N.A., 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3970 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), touched on the fact requirements that must be proven in a foreclosure action with respect to the acceleration notice. This notice has been the subject of a great many defenses at the trial court level and the subject of a fair amount of appeal briefs, as well.
As is normally the case in foreclosures, the current servicer of the loan in Allen was not the entity in interest at the time the notice of acceleration was purported to have been sent. Therefore (againa as is common in foreclosure cases), the new servicer detailed how it "onboarded" the previous bank's documents and reviewed them, and the designated servicer representative spoke confidently about what had happened with documents in the previous file (despite the fact that she could not have personally known what had transpired previously). The witness said that a letter was in the file and was dated which gave notice of the acceleration and that, because the letter was in the file, it must have been sent to the borrower (because, "servicers aren't in the habit of generating letters that they don't send" claimed the witness). However, no envelope with postage paid or other proof of actual mailing appeared in the file.
The trial court allowed the foreclosure to continue, but the Second DCA reversed, finding that simply drafting a document does not indicate the sending of that document and that, while onboarding does allow introduction of documents into evidence of the previous bank or servicer, it does not qualify a witness to testify about what happened with certain documents without actual personal knowledge of (at a minimum) knowledge of the business practices of the party that was purportedly mailing the notice. Thus, in Alen, the Second DCA again reminds banks that, yes, they must prove that they sent an acceleration notice to the borrower in order to foreclose the property and that it is not enough to simply indicate that the letter existed and was drafted at some point.
One challenge facing holders of judgments against a company that often arises is that of successor entities. Imagine holding a judgment against a company called “Bob’s Widgets” only to see that company dissolved with no assets remaining and then only to see a company called “Bobby’s Widgets” open in the same space, with the same equipment and owners, and selling the same goods to the same customers. The frustration caused by this ‘shell game’ can overwhelm litigants and attorneys alike.
A recent decision made clear that parties are allowed to seek recovery against a successor, alter-ego, or continuation of business entity either during or after judgment. Oceanside Plaza Condo. Ass'n v. Foam King Indus., No. 3D15-2449, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 16667, at *7 (3d DCA Nov. 9, 2016). The holding of this case and its predecessors allows claimants to pursue a company that is essentially a business entity continuing the same operations as either a successor or alter-ego as part of the first judgment or after that judgment is entered. Id.
This flexibility helps ensure the proper defendants are included in a case and also helps preserve both judicial economy (read: not wasting the court’s time) as well as the time and monetary resources of the aggrieved party.
If you have questions about your rights or you believe a company is playing a ‘shell game’ to avoid your valid claims, reach out to the litigation attorneys of Icard Merrill for a consultation.
A crucial blow to wayward borrowers and a life raft for inattentive banks and foreclosure counsel were handed out simultaneously by the Florida Supreme Court recently in Bartram v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 41 Fla. L. Weekly S493 (Fla. November 3, 2016). This case will likely have far-reaching impact in the foreclosure world and likely represents a death-knell for the “free house” dream held by many borrowers and defense attorneys.
Before the Court in Bartram was the issue of statute of limitations in a foreclosure action and the impact of acceleration letters from lenders. The essence of the issue could be summarized by stating that banks are generally owed payments on a monthly basis, but when buyers default, banks often “accelerate” the note, meaning that all remaining payments come due as of the month of the acceleration notice.
The argument by defense attorneys, therefore, has long been that, by the mechanism of the acceleration notice, no more payments are due after the date of acceleration and rather one lump final payment was due. The issue arose for lenders when they then either failed to bring an action within the five-year statute of limitations following that acceleration or the bank’s action was so mis-prosecuted that it ended up being dismissed or adjudicated against the bank (meaning that the court determined that the case brought on that accelerated obligation was found in favor of the borrower). Under either scenario, the argument went; the bank had no new defaulted obligation to complain of and could no longer bring a successful case against the homeowner.
However, the Bartram decision appears to have firmly slammed shut the door on that argument. Id. The Court held (in what could conceivably be called a bit of tortured logic) that a dismissal by the bank of its action effectively acts as a “revocation” of the acceleration clause and returns the parties to their pre-foreclosure positions (i.e., monthly payments again due). Id. This allows the bank to bring a new action on payments missed post-acceleration.
Curiously, the Court stated that this artificial “revocation” mechanism may not be allowed if there is an express term to the contrary in the parties’ note/mortgage (a term that has never likely been seen in any mortgage or note). What is also curious is how the Court seemed to ignore entirely the fact that acceleration notices are often sent in advance of a foreclosure action and are not a part of the action itself (raising the question of how far “pre-foreclosure” the parties are actually being returned—potentially months or maybe longer?). Also curiously, the Court was silent on whether the borrowers could then resume making payments on the newly re-instated monthly obligation (hint: the banks won’t allow that).
This case likely represents an ugly, but potentially necessary “bail-out” for banks and their attorneys. The logic and legal basis for the ruling is fairly questionable. Yet, it often happens that banks and the massive foreclosure-focused legal firms serving them are so inattentive that cases languish for months or years and are often dismissed or not brought in a timely manner.
Therefore, allowing banks a perpetual ‘do-over’ on bringing foreclosure cases probably reaches the correct result; homes that banks lent a lot of good money to buy are returned to the banks once the borrowers have long since stopped paying for them. It would be arguably a more logical result to have homes left in the hands of borrowers if banks and their attorneys botch the great many opportunities they have to properly foreclose, but it would not necessarily be the just result. In Bartram, the court appears to have recognized the just result and simply stretched (tortured) the law to achieve it, potentially sacrificing logic to get there.
If your home is in foreclosure, or you are a lender seeking a law firm that will actively protect your rights, contact the foreclosure attorneys at Icard Merrill today.
An interesting note for litigation practitioners was recently discussed in the Fifth District of Florida when the District Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether sworn statements of witnesses taken by counsel for one of the parties are entitled to privilege under the work product doctrine.
The work-product privilege, which generally protects the notes, written thoughts and expressions of counsel in anticipation of litigation, may not be generally thought of as a form of protection for statements made by third parties. In this way, the Selton v. Nelson, serves as a great reminder that sworn statements prepared by counsel for witnesses in a dispute are afforded work-product protection from discovery “absent rare and exceptional circumstances.” 41 Fla. L. Weekly D2337 (Fla. 5th DCA October 14, 2016). Stated differently, the court must determine whether the party seeking production would be unable to secure the equivalent without undue hardship. Id.
This case also serves as a reminder that there are many niche and unusual aspects of the law and litigation facing parties to a business dispute and that the best defense against unknowingly running afoul of either the law or the party’s rights is to seek the help of an experienced litigation attorney with knowledge of the pitfalls awaiting the unwary.
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (in Civil Action No. 4:16-CV-00731), twenty-one states recently brought a challenge and motion for temporary injuction seeking to prevent the implementation of a series of overtime law changes announced by the Department of Labor and which are set to go into effect on December 1, 2016.
In this case, Federal District Judge Mazzant is being asked by the states to forestall that implementation pending further challenge of a provision of the Department of Labor’s Final Rule that provides for an automatic updating adjustment mechanism whereby the minimum salary for executives to continue to be qualified for overtime exemption increases every three years (the first of which is set to take place January 1, 2020.
The States argument, in essense, is that the DOL’s policy changes attempt to unlawfully coerce the states and the businesses in those states to adopt certain wage and hour policies and to make certain choices in that regard that will disrupt (and interfere with) the States’ right to set their own policies in employee wage and hour law.
This case figures to be only one step in what is likely to be a broad salvo by states pushing back against the federal government attempting to set national wage and hour policies (and, some may argue, widespread social engineering).
UPDATE: The Texas District Court Judge issued on November 22, 2016 an order granting the states’ Emergency Injunction against the Department of Labor overtime changes, likely triggering increased and more heated litigation on the issue in the coming months. http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/d/26042
Arbitration clauses exist in plentitude all around us in most people’s everyday lives—they are in your contract with your builder, enclosed with a great many products you buy, and even in your workplace—but they generally go unnoticed unless and until something goes awry. In those instances, people are often surprised to find that they have (usually without any real knowledge or consideration) waived their right to have a dispute heard before a judge or jury. Instead, they are forced to take their case before a private arbitrator (in many-but not all-instances that person is an attorney in the field) and potentially pay to have their case heard.
Compelling arbitration has long been required where an arbitration agreement is found to be valid, to concern the issue presented, and to have not been waived. This is outlined in the recent case of All-S. Subcontractors, Inc. v. Amerigas Propane, Inc., and codified in Florida under Chapter 682. 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1859 (Fla. 1st DCA August 11, 2016). In All-S. Subcontractors, Inc., the seller of propane affixed a “Terms and Conditions” flyer to its invoices which contained an arbitration provision. It appears under the facts of the case that customers were neither expected to sign nor specifically told of this provision other than by attachment to a propane invoice.
Later, when a class action was sought by consumers against the propane seller, the seller attempted to force the parties to arbitrate based on that “Terms and Conditions” pamphlet attached to invoices. The lower court agreed, but was reversed on appeal by the 1st DCA, which found that the class action initially rested on an invoice from several years prior to the first time the “Terms and Conditions” were ever attached to invoices.
For consumers, the scary part of this case’s holding is the possibility by implication that, had the invoices in question been from after the period of time when the “Terms and Conditions” pamphlet started being attached to invoices, the dispute could have been forced into arbitration even absent any proof of actual knowledge by the consumers that they had waived their right to a judge or jury hearing their dispute.
This lesson is an old one and serves many people well—read your contracts and ensure you both understand and agree to the terms in them before you sign (or take delivery of the goods in instances such as that of the All-S. Subcontractors, Inc. case wherein no one was required to sign the agreement).
If you have questions about a contract or are facing arbitration, consult with the experienced litigators of Icard Merrill today.
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